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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 11-1221 
__________ 
 
THOMAS E. WOODS, 
       Appellant 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF 
FAYETTE 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-00121) 
District Judge: Hon. Donetta W. Ambrose 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 12, 2013 
 
Before: HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and STARK,

 District Judge. 
 
(Filed February 20, 2013) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________          
                                              

 Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware, sitting by designation. 
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner Thomas E. Woods was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Fayette County, Pennsylvania on one count of first degree murder and is currently 
serving a life sentence. He was unsuccessful in his direct appeal and also in state post-
conviction proceedings at the trial and appellate levels. Thereafter he was unsuccessful in 
obtaining habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. This Court granted in part Woods’s request for a Certificate of 
Appealability, stating that:  
Jurists of reason could debate whether: the prosecutor’s comments to the 
jury regarding [accomplice] Herbert Green’s plea agreement “so infec[ted] 
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process[,]” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted); . . . whether the Trial Court’s accomplice instruction 
violated Appellant’s constitutional rights under Cool v. United States, 409 
U.S. 100, 102-04 (1972); and whether trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for failing to raise those issues . . . .   
After reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the state 
court decision was neither “contrary to, [nor] an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), nor was it reached “based on an unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying habeas 
relief. 
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and prior proceedings of this case 
we will not reiterate them here.  
I.  
 “[The Supreme] Court has recognized that prosecutorial misconduct may so 
infec[t] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
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process.” Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Woods 
argues that the prosecutor’s use of accomplice Herbert Green’s plea agreement in his 
closing argument did just that. Petitioner relies on the rules and facts of Bisaccia v. Att’y 
Gen. of N.J., 623 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1980), to support his contention. “To constitute a due 
process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result 
in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). We are not persuaded that this occurred here.  
In Bisaccia, this Court held that “the admission of the co-defendant’s guilty plea, 
the failure of the trial judge to give cautionary instructions to the jury about this evidence 
and the prosecutor’s comments on this evidence so exceeded the tolerable level of 
ordinary trial error as to amount to a denial of constitutional due process.” 623 F.2d at 
313. However, the facts of Bisaccia are different from the facts here. In Bisaccia, the 
prosecutor used a co-conspirator’s testimony regarding his own guilty plea to establish 
that the defendant participated in a conspiracy. Id. at 308. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s 
closing statement contained inflammatory remarks that the defendants were treating the 
jury like “a bunch of five year old children” by denying the crime ever happened, given 
the co-conspirator’s guilty plea. Id. at 309. Here, the prosecutor referred to accomplice 
Green’s nolo contendere plea1 to third degree murder and his five to ten year term of 
imprisonment to impeach Green’s own trial testimony, which was inconsistent with and 
less incriminating than the prior statement that he had given to the police officer as part 
of his plea agreement. The prosecutor here did not use inflammatory remarks as did the 
prosecutor in Bisaccia, and did not use the plea agreement as substantive proof that 
Woods killed the victim, but rather to impeach Green’s credibility. Even if we agreed that 
                                              
1 The prosecutor misspoke and said that Herbert Green “pled guilty” rather than “no 
contest,” App. 720, but this does not affect our analysis. 
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the prosecutor’s actions constituted misconduct, we nevertheless would not conclude that 
the alleged misconduct “so infec[ted] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process.” See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765.   
II. 
In Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972), the Supreme Court held that 
accomplice instructions that predicate consideration of exculpatory accomplice testimony 
on finding that testimony to be true beyond a reasonable doubt violate a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment and due process rights. Id. at 102-104. Woods argues, relying on the facts of 
Cool, that the trial judge’s accomplice instructions violated his rights under the teachings 
of Cool. We disagree. 
In Cool the accomplice, called by the defendant, provided completely exculpatory 
testimony, “freely admit[ing] his own guilt, but steadfastly insist[ing] that neither 
petitioner nor her husband had anything to do with the crime.” Id. at 101. The trial judge 
then provided the jury with the following instruction regarding the accomplice’s 
testimony: “If the testimony carries conviction and you are convinced it is true beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . it is your duty [] not to throw this testimony out because it comes 
from a tainted source.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added in original). The Supreme Court 
concluded that this instruction violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right because it 
infringed upon the defendant’s right to present exculpatory accomplice testimony, and 
violated due process because given that the defendant’s case depended almost entirely on 
the accomplice’s testimony, the instruction required the defendant to establish his 
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, lowering the Government’s burden. Id. at 104. 
Here, Green clearly implicated Woods by testifying that the victim “got shot while 
he was engaging with a fight with Woods. Woods had to got his hand, got it away long 
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enough to take a shot into the man’s neck.” App. 633. Woods contends, however, that 
this testimony was exculpatory as to first degree murder, even if it was inculpatory as to 
Woods’s commission of a crime. In support of this position, Woods quotes Cool, which 
states that “even if it is assumed that [the accomplice’s] testimony was to some extent 
inculpatory, the instruction was still fundamentally unfair in that it told the jury that it 
could convict solely on the basis of accomplice testimony without telling it that it could 
acquit on this basis.” Cool, 409 U.S. at 103 n.4. Undoubtedly, a standard accomplice 
instruction may be confusing when, as here, accomplice testimony is exculpatory as to 
one count and inculpatory as to another. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the trial 
judge’s instruction was a constitutional error, because, as a whole, Green’s testimony was 
far more inculpatory than the testimony in Cool, which the Court stated it was willing to 
assume was inculpatory. Id.  
Additionally, the instruction in Cool suggested to the jury that it was not to 
consider the accomplice’s testimony unless it found it to be true beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 104. Here, however, the jury instruction merely stated that accomplice 
testimony should be viewed with “disfavor” and that if there was no independent 
evidence to support an accomplice’s testimony, the jury could “still find [Woods] guilty 
solely on the basis of [the accomplice’s] testimony, if . . . [it was] satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accomplice testified truthfully and that [Woods] is guilty.” App. 
733. Accordingly, unlike in Cool, nothing in the instruction here suggested to the jury 
that it was not to consider the exculpatory elements of Green’s testimony without first 
finding such testimony to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. Lastly, even if we agreed 
with Woods that the instruction was in error, we would not conclude that the error “had 
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substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See Fry v. 
Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
III. 
Woods argues his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise 
the issues above, such that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. In 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court articulated a two-part 
test for determining whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective.  First, the defendant 
must show that “trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.” Id. at 687-688.  We have said: “It is [] only the rare claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel that should succeed under the properly deferential standard to be 
applied in scrutinizing counsel’s performance.” United States v. Kauffman, 109 F.3d 186, 
190 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, the defendant 
must prove prejudice, or “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 693-694. 
 Woods cannot meet the requirements of Strickland for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. For the reasons stated above, trial counsel’s representation did not fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Neither the prosecutor’s statements regarding 
Green’s testimony nor the trial judge’s accomplice instructions violated Woods’s 
constitutional rights, and accordingly trial counsel’s failure to object does not fall 
“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. Moreover, 
Woods cannot demonstrate prejudice, as he cannot show that but for these alleged errors, 
the trial’s result would have been different. 
* * * * * 
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We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude 
that no further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be 
AFFIRMED. 
